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Behavioural Finance

Amos Tversky

Cognitive psychologist

Born 1937 • Passed away 1996

Co-developed prospect theory with Daniel Kahneman, showing that people weigh losses more heavily than equivalent gains.

Biography

Amos Tversky was a cognitive and mathematical psychologist, born in Haifa in 1937, whose collaboration with Daniel Kahneman produced the research programme that became behavioural economics. His own field was the formal study of how people judge, choose and compare, and he brought a mathematician's precision to questions that had been treated loosely.

The partnership began at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem around 1969 and produced two papers that carried unusual weight. The 1974 Science paper set out the heuristics people use to estimate probability. Prospect theory, published in Econometrica in 1979, described how people actually weigh risky outcomes, and it did so in a form precise enough for economists to work with.

Tversky also worked independently on the structure of similarity and choice, including feature-based accounts of how people judge two things to be alike and models of how options are eliminated during a decision. He held a professorship at Stanford University and received a MacArthur Fellowship in 1984. He passed away in 1996.

Career timeline

  1. 1937
    Born in Haifa.
  2. 1965
    Completes a PhD in psychology at the University of Michigan.
  3. 1969
    Begins the research collaboration with Daniel Kahneman.
  4. 1974
    Publishes "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" in Science with Kahneman.
  5. 1978
    Joins Stanford University.
  6. 1979
    Publishes prospect theory in Econometrica with Kahneman.
  7. 1984
    Receives a MacArthur Fellowship.
  8. 1996
    Passes away at the age of 59.

How he approached decision research

Tversky's distinctive contribution was formal. Psychology had described judgment errors before, but he stated them in structures precise enough to be tested, contradicted and used by other fields. Prospect theory is the clearest case: it is not a list of ways people go wrong but a model with a value function and a weighting of probabilities.

The second element was the choice of comparison. Rather than asking whether people were reasoning well in some general sense, the research fixed a normative benchmark and measured departures from it. That made results portable into economics, which already used the benchmark as its own foundation.

Key ideas

Tap any idea to expand a plain-English explanation, why it matters, and where to learn more.

Heuristics for judging probability

People estimate likelihood using shortcuts such as how easily an example comes to mind or how closely a case resembles a stereotype.

Why it matters

The shortcuts are efficient and often adequate, but they fail in specific, predictable ways that can be described in advance.

Example

A widely reported event feels more probable than a rarely reported one of similar frequency.

Framing effects

The same choice described in different terms produces different decisions, even when the options are identical.

Why it matters

It means presentation is not neutral, which matters wherever an investor is shown performance, fees or risk.

Example

Outcomes framed as a chance of loss are treated differently from the identical outcomes framed as a chance of gain.

Similarity is not symmetric

Judgments of how alike two things are depend on which one is treated as the subject of the comparison.

Why it matters

It showed that a basic building block of reasoning does not behave like the mathematical relation people assumed.

Example

People rate a lesser-known item as more similar to a well-known one than the reverse.

Risk seeking in the domain of losses

People tend to avoid risk when choosing among gains but accept it when choosing among losses.

Why it matters

It is the formal statement behind the tendency to take larger chances to avoid realising a loss.

Example

Someone facing a certain small loss may prefer a gamble with a worse expected outcome but a chance of breaking even.

Major contributions

  • Co-developed prospect theory with Daniel Kahneman, giving decision making under risk a formal descriptive model.
  • Co-authored the 1974 Science paper establishing the heuristics-and-biases research programme.
  • Developed feature-based accounts of similarity and models of choice by elimination in his independent work.
  • Demonstrated framing effects, showing that logically equivalent descriptions produce different decisions.

Major successes

  • Published prospect theory in Econometrica in 1979, which became one of the most cited papers in the social sciences.
  • Received a MacArthur Fellowship in 1984, awarded for the research programme on judgment and decision making.
  • Held a professorship in psychology at Stanford University.
  • Was elected to the National Academy of Sciences.

Important books

  • Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases1982

    An edited collection, with Daniel Kahneman and Paul Slovic, gathering the early research on judgment shortcuts.

Influence on investors

Prospect theory gave economists a model of choice they could use, which is why psychological findings entered economics through this work rather than through earlier critiques. Loss aversion and framing reached investing vocabulary along the same route.

Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize for work conducted jointly with Tversky, who had passed away six years earlier and was therefore ineligible. Kahneman consistently described the recognised research as shared.

Criticisms and debates

A balanced view includes the main criticisms and open debates, presented neutrally.

  • Researchers in the fast-and-frugal heuristics tradition argue that shortcuts are often well adapted to real environments rather than defective, and that laboratory tasks understate this.
  • Some experimental findings have proved sensitive to how questions are worded, raising questions about how far particular effects generalise.
  • The hot hand study he co-authored in 1985 has been revisited, with later work arguing that a statistical bias in the original method understated any real effect.
  • Critics note that documented individual biases do not automatically imply mispriced markets, since prices are set by marginal rather than average participants.

Lessons for investors

Plain-English takeaways. Context for learning, not advice to buy or sell anything.

  • 1Watch how a choice is described, because the description changes the decision even when the options do not.
  • 2Expect the pull toward risk to be strongest when you are trying to avoid realising a loss.
  • 3Treat ease of recall as a poor guide to how likely something actually is.

Notable quotes

“People are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.”

Sourced: Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 1979

Context: A core finding of prospect theory: people take the safe option when facing a gain, and take risk to avoid locking in a loss.

See Amos Tversky in the quote library

Frequently asked questions

Who was Amos Tversky?

Amos Tversky was a cognitive and mathematical psychologist born in Haifa in 1937 and a professor at Stanford University. He co-developed prospect theory with Daniel Kahneman and passed away in 1996.

Did he win the Nobel Prize?

No. The 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences went to Daniel Kahneman for work done jointly with Tversky, who had passed away in 1996. The prize is not awarded posthumously.

What did Tversky contribute to prospect theory?

He supplied much of the formal structure. Prospect theory is stated as a model with a value function over gains and losses and a weighting of probabilities, which is what made it usable by economists rather than only by psychologists.

What is a framing effect?

The finding that logically identical choices produce different decisions depending on how they are described, for example as a chance of gaining rather than a chance of losing.

What did he work on outside the Kahneman collaboration?

Formal models of similarity and choice, including feature-based accounts of how people judge things to be alike and models describing how options are eliminated during a decision.

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Philosophies Amos Tversky is associated with

Schools of thought whose practitioner list names them. Association is not endorsement of the approach.

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