Overview

Graham and Fisher published the founding texts of two approaches that look opposed and are usually practised together. Graham wanted evidence from the accounts because he did not trust judgment about the future. Fisher wanted judgment about the future because he did not think the accounts contained the important part.

Neither was arguing with the other directly, and there is no record of a dispute between them. The pairing matters because Warren Buffett described himself as part Graham and part Fisher, which is the clearest statement anyone has made about how the two fit together.

Quick comparison

How Benjamin Graham and Philip Fisher differ across seven dimensions
DimensionPortrait photo of Benjamin GrahamBenjamin GrahamPhilip Fisher
Investment philosophyBuy below a conservative estimate of what the assets are worth.Buy outstanding businesses and hold them for a very long time.
Risk philosophyRisk is paying too much, controlled by the size of the discount.Risk is owning a mediocre business, controlled by research before buying.
Valuation approachNet current assets, book value, and a low multiple of earnings.Qualitative, with price a secondary consideration to business quality.
Portfolio constructionWidely diversified across many statistical bargains.Concentrated in a small number of thoroughly researched companies.
DiversificationRequired, because individual cheap companies often deserve to be cheap.Overrated, and often an excuse for shallow research.
Market timingIrrelevant. Buy on the discount, sell when it closes.Irrelevant. The right holding period for an outstanding business is forever.
Economic beliefsNot part of the method by design.Not part of the method, though industry conditions matter a great deal.

Scroll the table sideways on a narrow screen. Each dimension is explained in full below.

Investment philosophy

Buy below a conservative estimate of what the assets are worth.

Buy outstanding businesses and hold them for a very long time.

Graham treated a share as a claim on assets and looked for a gap between price and countable worth. Fisher treated it as a stake in an organisation whose research culture and management determine what it becomes, none of which appears on a balance sheet.

Risk philosophy

Risk is paying too much, controlled by the size of the discount.

Risk is owning a mediocre business, controlled by research before buying.

Their protective mechanisms are completely different. Graham's is numeric and applied at the moment of purchase. Fisher's is investigative and applied beforehand, on the reasoning that a genuinely excellent company rarely needs to be bought at a bargain to work out.

Valuation approach

Net current assets, book value, and a low multiple of earnings.

Qualitative, with price a secondary consideration to business quality.

Fisher was willing to pay what looked expensive for a company with a long runway, which Graham's framework forbids outright. This is the substantive disagreement between them and the one Buffett had to resolve.

Portfolio construction

Widely diversified across many statistical bargains.

Concentrated in a small number of thoroughly researched companies.

Fisher argued that the work required to understand a company properly limits how many anyone can own, and that owning more than a handful means owning some you have not done the work on.

Diversification

Required, because individual cheap companies often deserve to be cheap.

Overrated, and often an excuse for shallow research.

Fisher was explicit that excessive diversification is a defence against ignorance. Graham would have agreed with the description and considered ignorance the normal condition, which is why he built a method that assumes it.

Market timing

Irrelevant. Buy on the discount, sell when it closes.

Irrelevant. The right holding period for an outstanding business is forever.

They agree that timing is not the activity, and differ on what ends a holding. Graham sells on a rule when the discount disappears; Fisher sells only if the original reasoning about the business turns out to be wrong.

Economic beliefs

Not part of the method by design.

Not part of the method, though industry conditions matter a great deal.

Neither forecast the economy. Fisher paid close attention to the prospects of an industry, which is a narrower question than the macro one.

Famous books

  • Security Analysis1934Benjamin Graham

    Written with David Dodd and still the reference point for the discipline. It set out how to value a security from its published accounts, covering bonds and preferred stock as carefully as ordinary shares. It became influential because it arrived when the case for equities had collapsed entirely and offered a way to distinguish a sound security from a wrecked one. It is a technical book and most readers should start elsewhere.

  • The Intelligent Investor1949Benjamin Graham

    His book for non-professionals, built around the margin of safety, the Mr Market metaphor and the split between defensive and enterprising investors. Buffett has called it the best book on investing ever written, singling out the chapters on market fluctuations and on the margin of safety. Its durability comes from being about temperament as much as technique, which is the part that has not dated. Most readers now meet it in the annotated edition.

  • The Interpretation of Financial Statements1937Benjamin Graham

    A short guide to reading a balance sheet and an income statement, written for people with no accounting background. It is the least famous of the three and the most immediately practical. Anyone who finds Security Analysis impenetrable usually finds this is the missing step.

  • Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits1958Philip Fisher

    The book that introduced scuttlebutt research and the fifteen points to look for in a company.

  • Conservative Investors Sleep Well1975Philip Fisher

    On what actually makes an investment conservative, which in his view had little to do with how quiet a share price is.

  • Developing an Investment Philosophy1980Philip Fisher

    A short account of how his own thinking formed, usually published together with Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits.

Famous quotes

Portrait photo of Benjamin GrahamBenjamin Graham

“In the short run, the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine.”

Sourced: The Intelligent Investor, 1949

“The intelligent investor is a realist who sells to optimists and buys from pessimists.”

Sourced: The Intelligent Investor, 1949
Philip Fisher

“The stock market is filled with individuals who know the price of everything, but the value of nothing.”

Sourced: Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, 1958

“I do not want a lot of good investments; I want a few outstanding ones.”

Sourced: Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, 1958

Biggest successes

  • Published Security Analysis with David Dodd in 1934, at the lowest point of the Depression and when confidence in equities had collapsed. It mattered because it replaced reputation and tips with a repeatable procedure, and it created security analysis as a discipline rather than a trade.
  • Wrote The Intelligent Investor in 1949 for readers who were not professionals. It has stayed continuously in print for more than seventy years, which makes it the route by which most people still encounter the idea that price and value are different things.
  • Bought a large stake in the insurer GEICO for the partnership in 1948. The position grew to outweigh everything else the partnership owned combined, and the irony is instructive: his single best result came from a concentrated holding of a growing business, which his own rules would have discouraged.
  • Ran Fisher and Company from 1931 into the 1990s, an unusually long span for a single investor managing money continuously.
  • Bought Motorola in 1955 and held the position for the rest of his life, through decades of change in the electronics industry.
  • Wrote Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, one of the first investment books to reach a wide general readership and still in print today.

Biggest criticisms

A balanced view includes the main criticisms of each approach, presented neutrally.

  • The clearest objection is that his method stopped finding anything. Critics argue that companies trading below net current assets were a product of the Depression and of an era before screening was computerised, and that the supply largely disappeared once everyone could run the filter. Supporters reply that the principle, buying at a discount to a conservative estimate, survives even when that particular screen is empty. The record favours the critics on the specific test and the supporters on the general one: deep bargains of that kind are now rare outside distressed corners, while the underlying logic remains in use.
  • His framework struggles with businesses whose value is not on the balance sheet. Critics point out that a company whose main asset is software, a brand or a research pipeline will look expensive on every measure he used, so the method systematically avoids exactly the businesses that have compounded most since. Supporters answer that Graham designed it to avoid unquantifiable judgments on purpose. What followed is that his own best pupils moved on: Buffett has said explicitly that paying up for quality, which Graham resisted, produced most of Berkshire's results.
  • Cheapness alone is a well-documented trap. Critics note that a low price often reflects a business in genuine decline, and that a purely statistical approach buys the falling knife along with the bargain. Supporters emphasise that Graham never advocated concentration in such names and insisted on wide diversification for exactly this reason. Later research broadly supports his structure rather than his critics here, since the value effect has generally shown up across baskets of cheap stocks rather than in individual picks.
  • Scuttlebutt research is far easier for a professional with industry contacts than for an individual investor, and its conclusions cannot be checked by anyone else.
  • Qualitative judgments about management quality are difficult to falsify, which makes it easy to keep believing an assessment long after the evidence has turned.
  • Holding only a handful of positions concentrates risk in a small number of outcomes, and one permanent mistake in a concentrated portfolio is expensive to recover from.

Lessons investors can learn

Plain-English takeaways. Context for learning, not advice to buy or sell anything.

  • 1The numbers tell you what a company has been; the qualitative work tells you what it may become, and both are evidence.
  • 2How much research a method requires determines how many positions it can support.
  • 3Deciding in advance what would make you sell is easier when the buy reason was concrete.

Who each approach suits

Best suited for

Investors who want an explicit, checkable process and who are uncomfortable relying on their own judgment about management or competitive position.

Best suited for

Investors willing to research a handful of companies deeply, including talking to customers, suppliers and competitors, and to hold for many years.

Common misconceptions

  • The claim

    Graham and Fisher were rivals.

    What is actually the case

    There is no record of a dispute between them. They worked on different problems and their approaches were combined by later investors rather than being fought over by the two of them.

  • The claim

    Fisher ignored price entirely.

    What is actually the case

    He treated price as secondary to quality, not irrelevant. His argument was that overpaying slightly for an outstanding business hurts less over decades than buying a poor one cheaply.

Frequently asked questions

Why would Graham reject the scuttlebutt method?

Because it rests on a judgment he did not think could be relied on. Fisher gathered opinions from customers, suppliers and competitors to assess competitive position. Graham built his method specifically so that no such judgment was required, on the reasoning that an investor who must also be a good judge of people has replaced one hard problem with another.

How did Buffett combine Graham and Fisher?

He has described himself as part Graham and part Fisher. He kept Graham's insistence on a margin of safety and the separation of price from value, and adopted Fisher's conviction that qualitative business quality is what produces long-run results.

Which approach requires more work?

Fisher's, by a wide margin. Graham's screens can be run mechanically from published accounts. Scuttlebutt research means gathering opinions from people connected to a business, which is slow, and it limits how many companies one investor can genuinely cover.

Does the scuttlebutt method still work?

The principle transfers and the execution has changed. Customer reviews, employee sites, industry forums and supplier disclosures now provide much of what Fisher gathered by telephone, though the volume makes filtering harder than collecting.

Can you use both approaches together?

Most modern value investors do, which is what the Buffett synthesis demonstrates. A common pattern is to use quantitative screens to narrow a universe and qualitative research to decide among the survivors.

Investing philosophies behind this debate

Schools of thought one or both of these investors are associated with.

Strategies these investors are associated with

What the disagreement looks like as an actual way of running a portfolio.

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Educational content only. This is a neutral comparison compiled for learning. It is not an endorsement of either approach, not investment advice, and not a claim that either person is always right. Mentioning someone here does not imply they are affiliated with Money Masters Media.